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US analyst: â€œAzerbaijan does not want a nuclear-armed Iran, but its immediate concern is to avoid an increase in hostilities with Tehranâ€

23 January 2012 11:49 (UTC +04:00)

Washington. Isabel Levine â€“ APA. APA Washington DC correspondentâ€™s interview with Alex Jackson, an independent analyst on security, political and economic issues in the Caspian region

- How would you characterize the US-Azerbaijan relations after Ambassador Matthew Bryza had to return to Washington DC?

- Matthew Bryzaâ€™s return to Washington will undoubtedly have a negative effect on the relationship between Azerbaijan and the US. The lack of an ambassador in Baku was already a point of tensions. Azerbaijan felt offended by the lack of attention being paid to it. Although official Baku understands that Bryzaâ€™s recall was an issue of domestic politics and not a strategic decision by the White House, another period without an ambassador will not be positive for the strategic partnership.

- Because of the Armenian Diasporaâ€™s criticism, Pres. Obamaâ€™s nominee to US Ambassador post in Azerbaijan faces with a hold in the Congress. How do you see the influence of the Armenian Diaspora factor in this election year? Can the Administration overcome controversial topics such as "Armenian genocide", Ambassadorsâ€™ appointments to Baku and Yerevan, etc?

- In an election year, neither Congress nor the White House has much appetite for foreign-policy moves which may cost them political capital without gaining anything in return. Electoral politics becomes more important than foreign policy. So although the Administration may wish to send Bryza to Baku, or to block votes on the Armenian genocide issue in Congress, electoral politics are an important factor.

The Democrats do not wish to alienate the Armenian-American lobby, which is influential in key electoral battlegrounds like California. So we can expect the US government to be very cautious on these sensitive issues in 2012, not making any bold moves or initiatives.

- Can we say that the year 2011 was unsuccessful in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations? How do you see the US position regarding that in 2012?

- 2011 was very unsuccessful in Karabakh negotiations; it marked the end of a relatively positive period which began immediately after the Russia-Georgia war of 2008. The last meeting, in Kazan in June, produced no results whatsoever, and the OSCE Minsk Group became extremely frustrated with the lack of progress.

The US position in 2012 will remain limited. Partly this is for domestic political reasons, as stated above, and partly this is because the US is content for Russia to take the lead on Karabakh negotiations.

- What are the main differences between the Russian and Western approaches towards Azerbaijan and South Caucasus security problems? On which part of the dividing line does Azerbaijan need to stay to ensure its security and development?

- Russia has been more balanced in its approach to South Caucasus security issues recently: it seems to have a real interest in developing a peaceful settlement. However with Vladimir Putin returning to power soon, this may change, as he takes a more aggressive and calculating approach. Ultimately, Russiaâ€™s policy is about realpolitik; Western policy is about negotiation and compromise.

In particular, Western policy is shaped by Azerbaijanâ€™s energy potential. This is important for Russia but it sees Azerbaijan more as a post-Soviet state and part of the key regional security architecture, not just a source of oil and gas.

Azerbaijan should â€“ and does â€“ balance between Russia and the West quite successfully. Russia is more important in security terms, whilst the West is a more attractive partner for economic development.

- What about the EU? How does the current economical crisis in Europe reflect on European integration process? May the crises cause a delay of the process?

- The financial crisis in Europe will almost certainly delay or stop the European integration processes. There is no political appetite in Europe for inviting in new and potentially difficult members. In addition, the states themselves have less interest in a Eurozone which is full of debt and political problems. Turkey is already less enthusiastic about joining, for instance, so why should countries of the Caucasus have much interest?

- Do you believe in prospective of energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and EU despite of Russia and Iranâ€™s protests against some projects in the Caspian basin?

- The only project to which Russia and Iran truly object is the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Azerbaijan has been cautious on this and there are no indications yet whether or not it will ever be built. Aside from this, Russia and Iran have accepted the EUâ€™s role in energy cooperation with Azerbaijan and are unlikely to object.

- How serious is the threat against Iran at the moment? What consequences and threats may Azerbaijan expect as one of Iranâ€™s northern neighbors from further developments?

- The threat against Iran is more serious than it has been for some time. Azerbaijan is very concerned about this; it has been pressured by the West to allow its territory to be used as a base against Iran and has denied this. Azerbaijan does not want a nuclear-armed Iran, but its immediate concern is to avoid an increase in hostilities with Tehran.

The actual effects on Azerbaijan of an Israeli/US attack would be limited, but if Baku was seen as cooperating with the US and Israel, Iran (and Russia) would become much more hostile towards Baku.