Foreign

Home page

Foreign

US analyst pessimistic about resolution of Nagorno Karabakh conflict

12 July 2011 11:54 (UTC +04:00)

Washington. Isabel Levine â€“ APA. APAâ€™s Washington DC correspondentâ€™s interview with Thomas Ambrosio, US analyst on South Caucasus issues, an Associate Professor of political science at North Dakota State University

- Two weeks after the meeting between Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents that organized by Russia how would you describe the significance of Karabakh negotiation process? And what do you expect from it?

- I have very, very low expectations. The central problem is that nothing has changed: the positions of the two sides have not changed, the situation on the ground has not changed, and the international environment has not changed. Given that we are coming up on two decades since this conflict entered its frozen stage, I find it amusing that before every summit there is optimism expressed by politicians, activists, and the press that â€˜this is the oneâ€™ to break the impasse. This conflict is frozen for a reason: the positions of the two sides are mutually incompatible. They are stuck in a zero-sum game: if Azerbaijanâ€™s territorial integrity and sovereignty is recognized, then Nagorno-Karabakh would have to give up its de facto independence and Armenia would have to relinquish its de facto Greater Armenia; if Nagorno-Karabakhâ€™s de facto independence was made de jure, then Azerbaijan would lose a large swath of its territory and its territorial integrity will be called into question. I see neither how this impasse can be broken nor do I see a reason for the perpetual pre-summit optimism â€“ the latter just seems like wishful thinking.

- One meeting after another, the Armenian side isnâ€™t taking a constructive position, according to Azerbaijani officials. What is the way out for Azerbaijan?

- There is nothing that can be done. Again, the positions of the two sides are incompatible. Unless something changes significantly (the positions of the sides, the situation on the ground, or the international environment) I do not see any offer that the Azeris could make that would be acceptable to both themselves and the other side.

- Is there any possibility that the US will take a more active role in the conflict adjustment, following Russia?

- It will change nothing, unless it represents a change in the international environment, which it wonâ€™t.
Like the positions of the two parties directly affected by the conflict, the American position has not changed and will likely not change any time in the future. Plus, to be brutally honest, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a rather low priority within the administration, given the other international and domestic crises either present or on the horizon. Therefore, I do not see anything different coming out of an American-led meeting than a Russian one or any other forum for that matter.

- How on the whole do you see the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process?

- I would say that this is does not seem like a negotiation process in any real sense. Maybe something different is going on behind closed doors, but from the outside it appears that these meetings are an internationally-required ritual in which the hosts get to pretend to play the role of â€˜peacemakerâ€™ and the two sides get together because they have to or else they will be seen as warmongers. Then the two sides present their well-known, mutually-incompatible positions to each other â€“ as they have at countless meetings beforehand. Then they go home to blame the other for the impasse, while the hosts say something to the effect that it was a good airing of views, but are disappointed by the lack of progress. I have no doubt that the successors of the current Minsk Group presidents (Obama, Medvedev, Sarkozy) will have their representatives facing the same set of issues with little to no progress â€“ I would even be willing to be that the successors of their successors will be in the same boat. However, it must be said that the current situation is better than having the two sides shooting at each other. Talking is better than shooting, so, in that sense, the parties and the external mediators will continue the diplomatic ritual.