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Thomas Ambrosio: â€œUnless Armenia softens its negotiating position with Azerbaijan, all of the talk of peace being contagious is largely just talkâ€

17 February 2010 05:27 (UTC +04:00)

- International moderators are still optimistic about the salvation of Nagorno-Karabakh? What is the main reason why Karabakh and other frozen conflicts are still not resolved?

- The current momentum of the frozen conflicts, based in large part upon the pattern since the mid-1990s, is that the status quo is most likely to prevail. This will be the case unless an outside force -- namely, Russia or the US -- changes things. The US is unlikely to do anything except continue the pattern of â€œsupporting the processâ€.

Since there has been no real progress on this process -- largely because the perspectives, interests, and solutions of the two sides are so diametrically opposed -- this amounts largely to empty words and a desire to appear ’engaged’. For Russia, the frozen nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suits its interests: Armenia is dependent Russia since the threat of Russian intervention is likely enough to stay the hand of Baku, which is wealthier, better-equipped, and more populous; Azerbaijan’s power in the region is weakened by the fact that it has one-seventh of its territory under occupation. Divide-and-conquer is an old, but effective, strategy of increasingly one’s relative power and Moscow plays this card well.

- Itâ€™s more than one year since Barack Obama became a president. Many experts say that the current administration differs from its predessers, especially in terms of relationship with Russia and frozen conflicts. How can you describe this difference between Obama and Bush administrations?

- First of all, I would argue that the â€œrebootâ€ or â€œresetâ€ of bilateral relations was a public relations stunt designed to make it appear as if the Obama administration is the ’un-Bush’. By this, I mean that the administration has sought in nearly every case to present itself as fundamentally different than its predecessor.

Initially, this was demonstrated by an almost blind reversal of Bush-era policies -- simply because the Bush administration supported one position, the Obama administration felt that it had to reverse course. This has calmed down a bit now, but it is still a noticeable pattern in this administration. So, the attempt to reset with Russia fits into this general trend -- engage all of those states with which the US had rocky relations and downgrade ties with those that which the Bush administration had a good relationship.

In terms of the specifics of the US-Russian relationship and its implications for the former Soviet Union, my observation is that the Obama administration has effectively acceded to a Russian sphere of influence within the region. I feel that they are doing this because they believe (wrongly, in my opinion), that if they â€œengageâ€ Moscow they will be able to get the Kremlin’s help on a variety of other issues (terrorism, Iran, etc.).

However, they fundamentally misunderstand two things. First, the problems between the US and Russia during the second half of the Bush administration were due primarily to difference of and clashes between perceived interests. At its core, these differences/clashes stem from the place of Russia within the international system generally and within the region specifically. They were not simply due to the particularities of the Bush administration’s policies nor can they be changed merely with a rhetorical reboot/reset.

Second, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin will respond positively to the Obama administration’s attempt to ’engage’ them. This is not to say that "the Russians only understand force." Instead, the more likely outcome is that Moscow will see the administration’s policies as a sign of weakness and that they will continue to push the administration, to strengthen their hold over the former Soviet Union, and, finally, to be more obstructionist on policy issues outside of the region because they know that they will not pay any price. This is consistent with what we see as a general pattern as other countries react to this new strategy: Obama is definitely someone the world can say ’no’ to and get away with it.

- Another tension in the region is the moralization between Turkey and Armenia. Do you believe Turkish-Armenan agreement be will be reliable if there is no peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia?

- I am not convinced that this agreement will actually come to fruition. It appears that it is stuck in the Turkish parliament which refuses to vote on it unless Armenia softens its negotiating position vis-a-vis Azerbaijan and affects real change in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since Yerevan is unlikely to do this, all of the talk of peace being contagious is largely just that -- talk.

Granted, anything can happen. But just because the parties to a conflict are talking does not mean that substantive progress is being made, even if they are talking a lot. Before every Nagorno-Karabakh meeting, going back at least as far as the â€œKey West Summitâ€ during the first six-months of the Bush administration, the optimists were saying that ’a breakthrough is imminent. Every time they were disappointed. This does not mean that progress on Nagorno-Karabakh is impossible. However, history is with the pessimists on this one. Since Ankara has seemingly linked its normalization with Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, there are good reasons to be pessimistic about both.