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American expert Scott Radnitz: As memories of suffering are turned into narratives of victimization on both sides, people are unwilling to make even small concessions

03 November 2010 11:30 (UTC +04:00)

Washington. Isabel Levine â€“ APA. APAâ€™s Washington DC correspondentâ€™s interview with Scott Radnitz, Assistant Professor at the Jackson School of International Studies of University of Washington, who currently works on a project that includes a laboratory experiment on framing processes and historical narratives relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

- How would you describe the security situation in the South Caucasus?

- Because the 2008 war (Russian-Georgia) was driven largely by the deterioration of the US-Russia relationship, especially on the issue of NATO enlargement, the security situation in the Caucasus is in general more stable since President Obamaâ€™s "reset" policy toward Russia has improved bilateral relations. Nonetheless there is always a risk of a renewal of low-scale violence while the "frozen" conflicts still remain unresolved.

- What it comes to Karabakh example, are the sides ready to reach an agreement? And what is needed to be done by the parties involved and world mediators?

- I would say resolving the conflict in a peaceful way in the near future is unlikely. There is obviously no overlap in the position as to the final status of Karabakh: Azerbaijan insists that it should remain part of Azerbaijan, while Armenia does not accept that position, insisting instead on a vote for independence. While this aspect of the negotiations remains unresolved--as it will most likely be for the foreseeable future - a resolution that encompasses more manageable issues, such as the return of refugees and IDPs and the withdrawal of Armenia from the seven regions of Azerbaijan that surround Karabakh, will be difficult to attain.

- Ð¡an the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict be compared to other conflicts, such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off? In what ways are their road-maps similar?

- First, the ill-feeling generated during the conflict has a long-lasting impact on the possibilities for reconciliation between the warring sides. As memories of suffering are turned into narratives of victimization on both sides, people are unwilling to make even small concessions. Second, as a result of popular sentiment, politicians find it difficult to make deals with their adversary. Instead, they benefit politically by fanning the flames of resentment at home. Unfortunately, this has the effect of limiting their ability to make the concessions necessary for a long-term resolution of the conflict, as such moves would risk provoking a massive backlash from the populace. Resolution will take a combination of courageous leadership on both sides and a change in public opinion over time that involves a shift from a desire for retribution to a recognition of long-term interests. This is not an easy transition for any society, and Western mediators should reflect on the centuries of strife that Europe endured before elites internalized the importance of reconciliation and built institutions to manage conflict in peaceful ways.

- How important is the South Caucasus region for global affairs?

- The region is very important for surrounding countries--Russia, Turkey, and Iran for example. It is not terribly high in the agenda of Western Europe or the US, as it is overshadowed in strategic importance by China and the Middle East, among others. Nonetheless, both Europe and the US should continue to devote time and resources to the South Caucasus, by encouraging political reform and sustainable economic growth domestically, and facilitating cooperation between states in the region.

- But in what way can these countries become closer to the West, and for example, integrate into Europeanâ€“Atlantic structures?

- Strategic thinkers should seek ways to ensure that competition in the region is not zero-sum. South Caucasus states, rather than plan for a world in which Russia is an aggressor that needs to be balanced against, would be best served by getting their own houses in order, economically and politically. Since the Cold War has ended, NATO is no longer a bulwark against Russia. If Azerbaijan wants more engagement with the West, attracting western investment should be its goal. If successful, it could join the WTO or perhaps even one day be invited to join the European Union or its successor, which would provide far greater benefits to its society than joining a military alliance that has not yet figured out its own purpose.