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Former Director of US Department of Defense Eurasian Policy: â€œThe Caucasus region is fraught with risks of conflict if the protracted nature of these conflicts remains soâ€ â€“ INTERVIEW

02 August 2010 13:49 (UTC +04:00)

Washington. Isabel Levine â€“ APA. APAâ€™s Washington DC correspondentâ€™s interview with Jon Chicky, Former Director of Eurasian Policy at US Department of Defense, who currently serves as a member of Military Faculty at National War College.

- On the second anniversary of the last war in South Caucasus many local analysts question whether the stability in the region is strong and if there is any possibility of destabilization?

- My assessment of the security situation in the Caucasus region is that it remains uncertain. While the region seems generally stable, this stability is very fragile. Whether one looks at the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Mountainous Karabakh, the danger that constantly exists is of a small military action along the line of contact (Karabakh) or the administrative boundaries (Abkhazia/South Ossetia) that inadvertently grows out of control and thus into something more serious.

Throughout the South Caucasus region there are relatively large numbers of opposing military forces in close contact with one another with little or no third party observers separating these forces. This current state of affairs should cause one concern, though I must say, it is a testament to efforts of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders that the protracted Karabakh conflict has thus far not spiraled into a major war given the proximity of their respective military forces along the line of contact (LOC), the numerous skirmishes that have occurred along the LOC, and the total absence of on-the-ground observers, with the notable exception of OSCE monitors who periodically visit the LOC. The deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), while restricted to only the Georgian side of the Abkhaz and Ossetian administrative boundaries, is extremely beneficial in providing impartial "eyes and ears" on-the-ground to confirm or deny accusations from one party or the other about acts of violence or militarily threatening actions.

Additionally, one shouldnâ€™t ignore the situation in the North Caucasus when examining the security situation in the Caucasus region. The level of violence across the entire North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation has greatly increased since the summer of 2008. There exists the possibility that North Caucasus violence could spill-over into the South Caucasus.

In the final analysis, the region is fraught with risks of conflict if the protracted nature of these conflicts remains so. This is why diplomatic efforts by all parties must work harder to, in the first instance, improve the ways to "manage" these protracted conflicts and then, concurrently, work to find durable ways to resolve them.

- Another question became actual after the Georgian war - should the South Caucasus countries look their stability and protection in NATO? Is there any possibility for them to integrate into it?

- Presently, I do not see Azerbaijan becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the near to mid-term. It seems that Azerbaijan is not pursuing NATO membership but rather increased cooperation and it does not appear that NATO is enthusiastic about gaining new members beyond those in the western Balkans.

Regarding the question of potential NATO membership, first and foremost, Azerbaijan has to decide whether joining NATO is in the national interest of the country. The Azerbaijani government, representing the will of its people, will have to conduct a net assessment of the nationâ€™s domestic and foreign environment considering the opportunities as well as the challenges of possible NATO membership. Additionally, NATOâ€™s 28 Alliance members will have to consider whether Azerbaijanâ€™s joining their ranks enhances the security interests of the Alliance. Finally, Azerbaijan will have to undergo a series of political and defense-oriented reforms before it becomes a member of the Alliance. I do not believe that NATO would consider either Azerbaijan or Georgia (or Armenia) for membership as long as their respective protracted conflicts remain unresolved. The 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia dispelled the myth that these conflicts are "frozen" and therefore many members of the Alliance could be concerned that a renewed conflict in the South Caucasus could either potentially drag the Alliance into this conflict and/or cause a fractious debate within the North Atlantic Council on the applicability of Article 5 to this hypothetical scenario. That being said, the existence of these protracted conflicts should not prevent any South Caucasus country from joining membership preparation processes as long as this country undertakes the tough and deep reforms necessary to make it eligible for full membership. Nevertheless, final accession into the Alliance would probably hinge on the status of these protracted conflicts. NATO does have a role to play in promoting security in the region. The existing Partnership for Peace (PfP) program offers opportunities to enhance defense dialogue, conduct multilateral exercises, and provide expertise on defense institution reform. These activities provide the building blocks for security promotion. It is up to the regional states to decide how robust they want their engagement with NATO to be. That being said, the Alliance as the premier political-military organization in Europe, should take on a more active role in thinking through the complex security issues that face the region, a region that is part of the Euro-Atlantic security sphere.

- When talking about stability in South Caucasus Russia and US come on agenda. Moscow still considers the region under it influence. Do you think US and Russia can anyhow co-operate in that region?

- There is some cooperation already between the Russian Federation and the U.S. in strategic or global security. However, I consider this cooperation to be in its early stages. In terms of the South Caucasus, U.S. and Russian views on the region are divergent. The possible exception is the Mountainous Karabakh issue. Even here, U.S. and Russian interests may not always be congruent. Concerning Georgia, the U.S. and Russia fundamentally have differing views concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia and thus Georgia remains a friction point in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship.
One area of possible cooperation between the U.S. and Russia could be on strategic missile defense. Both parties could develop an arrangement with Azerbaijan to cooperate at the Gabala radar site in terms of early warning and detection of missile launches from southern Asia. Even here, there is much work that needs to be done to overcome Russiaâ€™s concerns that the U.S. missile defense programs are fundamentally destabilizing to strategic stability.