The trilateral statement signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia on November 10, 2020, is the key document defining the new geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus.
Despite nearly four years having passed since the signing of this statement, which concluded the 44-day war that ended in Azerbaijan's victory, the document still unsettles some power centers and regional players.
In particular, the 9th paragraph of the statement regarding the opening of the Zangezur Corridor is a major cause of this concern. In this paragraph of the trilateral document, which was also signed by Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia has taken on the obligation to ensure transportation links between Azerbaijan's western regions and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.
However, this paragraph has not been implemented to this day due to Armenia's unconstructive stance, and the Zangezur Corridor has yet to be operational.
Unfortunately, it is not Armenia but Iran that has been more obstructive and concerned about the implementation of this paragraph. This obstruction and concern have been clearly evident in various statements made at different levels in Iran since the signing of the trilateral statement.
The main theme of these statements is Iran's opposition to 'changes to the geopolitical and internationally recognized borders of the region.' Through its statements, Iran primarily points to the territorial integrity of Armenia, expresses concern about the potential closure of the border with Armenia, and views the Zangezur Corridor as a threat in this context.
However, the trilateral statement does not include any provisions for changing borders or making claims on Armenian territory. Although it is part of Azerbaijan's historic territory, Azerbaijan does not claim the Western Zangezur region of Armenia and views this area merely as a transit zone that will connect Nakhchivan, facilitating the movement of people and goods. There is no legal basis for any claims suggesting that the trilateral agreement means Zangezur would be taken out of Armenian control. Using this as an excuse to prevent the opening of the corridor constitutes a blatant violation of the trilateral agreement. It is worth noting that Armenia itself is a party to the preparation and signing of this agreement.
As mentioned, this is solely about opening a transport corridor; no one is restricting Iranian territory or imposing any limitations on Iran. There is no threat to its territorial integrity or security.
Moreover, there are significant questions raised by Iranian circles calling the Zangezur Corridor a NATO corridor, especially in light of the silence of NATO member countries, including the European Union, regarding the activities of the observation mission stationed in Armenia.
Iran is manipulating the facts by creating the phrase NATO corridor. The USA and the West do not hide that they are actually working on plans to establish a NATO base in Armenia, and it seems ridiculous that Tehran ignores this and talks about the non-existent "NATO corridor".
Statements by various officials that the European Union observation mission in Armenia actually collects intelligence information against Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran in particular do not worry Iran for some reason, Tehran does not touch the mission's activities.
Therefore, the logic of these statements made by Iran is not understandable.
Recently, Iran's aggressive rhetoric against the opening of the Zangezur Corridor is also reflected in its relations with Russia, which is one of the parties to the tripartite agreement. In particular, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement to Russia's First Channel some time ago that Pashinyan sabotaged tripartite agreements and said that the communications passing through the Sunik region of Armenia (Zangezur-ed.) should not be opened precisely because of his stubbornness made Tehran act in this regard.
Firstly, Iran stated its position regarding the opposition to the route connecting the main part of Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenia in a meeting between the Russian ambassador in Tehran and the head of the Eurasian Department of the Iranian Foreign Ministry and assistant minister Mojtaba Demirchilu. After that, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in his post on the X account, actually hinted at the Zangazur Corridor and wrote: "Any threat to the territorial integrity of our neighbors or changing the borders is completely unacceptable and this is a red line for Iran."
In general, in recent days, similar statements have been made by various Iranian officials. Nasser Kanani, the official representative of the Iranian MFA, Mehdi Sobhani , the Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Ali Nikzad, Deputy Chair of the Iranian parliament, Hassan Ghashghavi, Member of Parliament and others express their dissatisfaction with Moscow about the Zangazur Corridor, sometimes openly, sometimes implicitly.
But the official Tehran forget that the position of Russia, as well as the statements of Lavrov does not go beyond the terms of the tripartite international document agreed and signed by all parties and are quite constructive.
Instead of protesting against the activities of the monitoring mission of the European Union militarized and full of NATO emissaries stationed on the official borders of Tehran, or Armenia conducting joint military exercises with the United States on its territory, Iran is using diplomatic power to counter Russia's rightful claims regarding the implementation of the tripartite statement, which Yerevan has not withdrawn or renounced. If Iran claims that its ties will be cut with Armenia, it should know that the Zangazur Corridor does not include this at all and does not impose any restrictions on Armenia's territorial integrity. No, if Iran is worried about the control of the corridor by Russian border guards, it should not forget that it is Russian border guards who have been serving on the Armenian-Iranian border for 30 years.
This tension on the Tehran-Moscow line may be due to Iran's desire to regulate relations with the West amid the upcoming presidential elections in the United States. At a time when Russia is intensifying its relations with Iran against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis, official Tehran can play a double game and get maximum dividends from both sides. Tehran's immediate denial of the news about Iran's sale of weapons, missiles and drones to Russia, which has a certain factual basis, should be viewed in the context of not worsening relations with the West. Here, the desire of the new Iranian president and his team to find an optimal way out of the nuclear program, and to achieve the lifting of some of the Western sanctions, is noticeable.
On the other hand, by opposing the Zangazur Corridor, Iran pursues not only geopolitical but also geoeconomic interests. Thus, the official sees the corridor that will bypass the territory of Tehran and connect the western regions of Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan as a rival to the existing and modernized route. In the global context, it cannot agree that a convenient international transport route connecting China and Central Asia with Europe will be lost.
Therefore, it does not seem convincing that Iran's concerns about the opening of the Zangazur Corridor are related to Armenia's territorial integrity.